MECURY: Practical Cross-Chain Exchange via Trusted Hardware
Fuente:
arXiv
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2024
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| _version_ | 1866910616765071360 |
|---|---|
| author | Wen, Xiaoqing Feng, Quanbi Niu, Jianyu Zhang, Yinqian Feng, Chen |
| author_facet | Wen, Xiaoqing Feng, Quanbi Niu, Jianyu Zhang, Yinqian Feng, Chen |
| contents | The proliferation of blockchain-backed cryptocurrencies has sparked the need for cross-chain exchanges of diverse digital assets. Unfortunately, current exchanges suffer from high on-chain verification costs, weak threat models of central trusted parties, or synchronous requirements, making them impractical for currency trading applications. In this paper, we present MERCURY, a practical cryptocurrency exchange that is trust-minimized and efficient without online-client requirements. MERCURY leverages Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) to shield participants from malicious behaviors, eliminating the reliance on trusted participants and making on-chain verification efficient. Despite the simple idea, building a practical TEE-assisted cross-chain exchange is challenging due to the security and unavailability issues of TEEs. MERCURY tackles the unavailability problem of TEEs by implementing an efficient challenge-response mechanism executed on smart contracts. Furthermore, MERCURY utilizes a lightweight transaction verification mechanism and adopts multiple optimizations to reduce on-chain costs. Comparative evaluations with XClaim, ZK-bridge, and Tesseract demonstrate that MERCURY significantly reduces on-chain costs by approximately 67.87%, 45.01%, and 47.70%, respectively. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2409_14640 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | MECURY: Practical Cross-Chain Exchange via Trusted Hardware Wen, Xiaoqing Feng, Quanbi Niu, Jianyu Zhang, Yinqian Feng, Chen Cryptography and Security Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing The proliferation of blockchain-backed cryptocurrencies has sparked the need for cross-chain exchanges of diverse digital assets. Unfortunately, current exchanges suffer from high on-chain verification costs, weak threat models of central trusted parties, or synchronous requirements, making them impractical for currency trading applications. In this paper, we present MERCURY, a practical cryptocurrency exchange that is trust-minimized and efficient without online-client requirements. MERCURY leverages Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) to shield participants from malicious behaviors, eliminating the reliance on trusted participants and making on-chain verification efficient. Despite the simple idea, building a practical TEE-assisted cross-chain exchange is challenging due to the security and unavailability issues of TEEs. MERCURY tackles the unavailability problem of TEEs by implementing an efficient challenge-response mechanism executed on smart contracts. Furthermore, MERCURY utilizes a lightweight transaction verification mechanism and adopts multiple optimizations to reduce on-chain costs. Comparative evaluations with XClaim, ZK-bridge, and Tesseract demonstrate that MERCURY significantly reduces on-chain costs by approximately 67.87%, 45.01%, and 47.70%, respectively. |
| title | MECURY: Practical Cross-Chain Exchange via Trusted Hardware |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.14640 |