Unbiased third-party bots lead to a tradeoff between cooperation and social payoffs

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Hauptverfasser: He, Zhixue, Shen, Chen, Shi, Lei, Tanimoto, Jun
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2024
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author He, Zhixue
Shen, Chen
Shi, Lei
Tanimoto, Jun
author_facet He, Zhixue
Shen, Chen
Shi, Lei
Tanimoto, Jun
contents The rise of artificial intelligence (AI) offers new opportunities to influence cooperative dynamics with greater applicability and control. In this paper, we examine the impact of third-party bots--agents that do not directly participate in games but unbiasedly modify the payoffs of normal players engaged in prisoner's dilemma interactions--on the emergence of cooperation. Using an evolutionary simulation model, we demonstrate that unbiased bots are unable to shift the defective equilibrium among normal players in well-mixed populations. However, in structured populations, despite their unbiased actions, the bots spontaneously generate distinct impacts on cooperators and defectors, leading to enhanced cooperation. Notably, bots that apply negative influences are more effective at promoting cooperation than those applying positive ones, as fewer bots are needed to catalyze cooperative behavior among normal players. However, as the number of bots increases, a trade-off emerges: while cooperation is maintained, overall social payoffs decline. These findings highlight the need for careful management of AI's role in social systems, as even well-intentioned bots can have unintended consequences on collective outcomes.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2409_14975
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Unbiased third-party bots lead to a tradeoff between cooperation and social payoffs
He, Zhixue
Shen, Chen
Shi, Lei
Tanimoto, Jun
Physics and Society
Computers and Society
The rise of artificial intelligence (AI) offers new opportunities to influence cooperative dynamics with greater applicability and control. In this paper, we examine the impact of third-party bots--agents that do not directly participate in games but unbiasedly modify the payoffs of normal players engaged in prisoner's dilemma interactions--on the emergence of cooperation. Using an evolutionary simulation model, we demonstrate that unbiased bots are unable to shift the defective equilibrium among normal players in well-mixed populations. However, in structured populations, despite their unbiased actions, the bots spontaneously generate distinct impacts on cooperators and defectors, leading to enhanced cooperation. Notably, bots that apply negative influences are more effective at promoting cooperation than those applying positive ones, as fewer bots are needed to catalyze cooperative behavior among normal players. However, as the number of bots increases, a trade-off emerges: while cooperation is maintained, overall social payoffs decline. These findings highlight the need for careful management of AI's role in social systems, as even well-intentioned bots can have unintended consequences on collective outcomes.
title Unbiased third-party bots lead to a tradeoff between cooperation and social payoffs
topic Physics and Society
Computers and Society
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.14975