Lattice-Based Vulnerabilities in Lee Metric Post-Quantum Cryptosystems
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arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866914972612689920 |
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| author | Horlemann, Anna-Lena Khathuria, Karan Newman, Marc Sakzad, Amin Cabello, Carlos Vela |
| author_facet | Horlemann, Anna-Lena Khathuria, Karan Newman, Marc Sakzad, Amin Cabello, Carlos Vela |
| contents | Post-quantum cryptography has gained attention due to the need for secure cryptographic systems in the face of quantum computing. Code-based and lattice-based cryptography are two prominent approaches, both heavily studied within the NIST standardization project. Code-based cryptography -- most prominently exemplified by the McEliece cryptosystem -- is based on the hardness of decoding random linear error-correcting codes. Despite the McEliece cryptosystem having been unbroken for several decades, it suffers from large key sizes, which has led to exploring variants using metrics than the Hamming metric, such as the Lee metric. This alternative metric may allow for smaller key sizes, but requires further analysis for potential vulnerabilities to lattice-based attack techniques. In this paper, we consider a generic Lee metric based McEliece type cryptosystem and evaluate its security against lattice-based attacks. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2409_16018 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Lattice-Based Vulnerabilities in Lee Metric Post-Quantum Cryptosystems Horlemann, Anna-Lena Khathuria, Karan Newman, Marc Sakzad, Amin Cabello, Carlos Vela Cryptography and Security Information Theory Post-quantum cryptography has gained attention due to the need for secure cryptographic systems in the face of quantum computing. Code-based and lattice-based cryptography are two prominent approaches, both heavily studied within the NIST standardization project. Code-based cryptography -- most prominently exemplified by the McEliece cryptosystem -- is based on the hardness of decoding random linear error-correcting codes. Despite the McEliece cryptosystem having been unbroken for several decades, it suffers from large key sizes, which has led to exploring variants using metrics than the Hamming metric, such as the Lee metric. This alternative metric may allow for smaller key sizes, but requires further analysis for potential vulnerabilities to lattice-based attack techniques. In this paper, we consider a generic Lee metric based McEliece type cryptosystem and evaluate its security against lattice-based attacks. |
| title | Lattice-Based Vulnerabilities in Lee Metric Post-Quantum Cryptosystems |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Information Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.16018 |