Glitch in Time: Exploiting Temporal Misalignment of IMU For Eavesdropping
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866917890622488576 |
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| author | Najeeb, Ahmed Rafay, Abdul Bhatti, Naveed Anwar Alizai, Muhammad Hamad |
| author_facet | Najeeb, Ahmed Rafay, Abdul Bhatti, Naveed Anwar Alizai, Muhammad Hamad |
| contents | The increasing use of voice assistants and related applications has raised significant concerns about the security of Inertial Measurement Units (IMUs) in smartphones. These devices are vulnerable to acoustic eavesdropping attacks, jeopardizing user privacy. In response, Google imposed a rate limit of 200 Hz on permission-free access to IMUs, aiming to neutralize such side-channel attacks. Our research introduces a novel exploit, STAG, which circumvents these protections. It induces a temporal misalignment between the gyroscope and accelerometer, cleverly combining their data to resample at higher rates and reviving the potential for eavesdropping attacks previously curtailed by Google's security enhancements. Compared to prior methods, STAG achieves an 83.4% reduction in word error rate, highlighting its effectiveness in exploiting IMU data under restricted access and emphasizing the persistent security risks associated with these sensors. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2409_16438 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Glitch in Time: Exploiting Temporal Misalignment of IMU For Eavesdropping Najeeb, Ahmed Rafay, Abdul Bhatti, Naveed Anwar Alizai, Muhammad Hamad Cryptography and Security The increasing use of voice assistants and related applications has raised significant concerns about the security of Inertial Measurement Units (IMUs) in smartphones. These devices are vulnerable to acoustic eavesdropping attacks, jeopardizing user privacy. In response, Google imposed a rate limit of 200 Hz on permission-free access to IMUs, aiming to neutralize such side-channel attacks. Our research introduces a novel exploit, STAG, which circumvents these protections. It induces a temporal misalignment between the gyroscope and accelerometer, cleverly combining their data to resample at higher rates and reviving the potential for eavesdropping attacks previously curtailed by Google's security enhancements. Compared to prior methods, STAG achieves an 83.4% reduction in word error rate, highlighting its effectiveness in exploiting IMU data under restricted access and emphasizing the persistent security risks associated with these sensors. |
| title | Glitch in Time: Exploiting Temporal Misalignment of IMU For Eavesdropping |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.16438 |