Time Constant: Actuator Fingerprinting using Transient Response of Device and Process in ICS
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866916410694828032 |
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| author | Ahmed, Chuadhry Mujeeb Calder, Matthew Gunawan, Sean Prakash, Jay Nagaraja, Shishir Zhou, Jianying |
| author_facet | Ahmed, Chuadhry Mujeeb Calder, Matthew Gunawan, Sean Prakash, Jay Nagaraja, Shishir Zhou, Jianying |
| contents | Command injection and replay attacks are key threats in Cyber Physical Systems (CPS). We develop a novel actuator fingerprinting technique named Time Constant. Time Constant captures the transient dynamics of an actuator and physical process. The transient behavior is device-specific. We combine process and device transient characteristics to develop a copy-resistant actuator fingerprint that resists command injection and replay attacks in the face of insider adversaries. We validated the proposed scheme on data from a real water treatment testbed, as well as through real-time attack detection in the live plant. Our results show that we can uniquely distinguish between process states and actuators based on their Time Constant. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2409_16536 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Time Constant: Actuator Fingerprinting using Transient Response of Device and Process in ICS Ahmed, Chuadhry Mujeeb Calder, Matthew Gunawan, Sean Prakash, Jay Nagaraja, Shishir Zhou, Jianying Cryptography and Security Command injection and replay attacks are key threats in Cyber Physical Systems (CPS). We develop a novel actuator fingerprinting technique named Time Constant. Time Constant captures the transient dynamics of an actuator and physical process. The transient behavior is device-specific. We combine process and device transient characteristics to develop a copy-resistant actuator fingerprint that resists command injection and replay attacks in the face of insider adversaries. We validated the proposed scheme on data from a real water treatment testbed, as well as through real-time attack detection in the live plant. Our results show that we can uniquely distinguish between process states and actuators based on their Time Constant. |
| title | Time Constant: Actuator Fingerprinting using Transient Response of Device and Process in ICS |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.16536 |