Describing Deferred Acceptance and Strategyproofness to Participants: Experimental Analysis
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866916412305440768 |
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| author | Gonczarowski, Yannai A. Heffetz, Ori Ishai, Guy Thomas, Clayton |
| author_facet | Gonczarowski, Yannai A. Heffetz, Ori Ishai, Guy Thomas, Clayton |
| contents | We conduct an incentivized lab experiment to test participants' ability to understand the DA matching mechanism and the strategyproofness property, conveyed in different ways. We find that while many participants can (using a novel GUI) learn DA's mechanics and calculate its outcomes, such understanding does not imply understanding of strategyproofness (as measured by specially designed tests). However, a novel menu description of strategyproofness conveys this property significantly better than other treatments. While behavioral effects are small on average, participants with levels of strategyproofness understanding above a certain threshold play the classical dominant strategy at very high rates. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2409_18166 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Describing Deferred Acceptance and Strategyproofness to Participants: Experimental Analysis Gonczarowski, Yannai A. Heffetz, Ori Ishai, Guy Thomas, Clayton General Economics Economics Computer Science and Game Theory We conduct an incentivized lab experiment to test participants' ability to understand the DA matching mechanism and the strategyproofness property, conveyed in different ways. We find that while many participants can (using a novel GUI) learn DA's mechanics and calculate its outcomes, such understanding does not imply understanding of strategyproofness (as measured by specially designed tests). However, a novel menu description of strategyproofness conveys this property significantly better than other treatments. While behavioral effects are small on average, participants with levels of strategyproofness understanding above a certain threshold play the classical dominant strategy at very high rates. |
| title | Describing Deferred Acceptance and Strategyproofness to Participants: Experimental Analysis |
| topic | General Economics Economics Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.18166 |