Mechanism Design with Delegated Bidding
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Main Authors: | Aggarwal, Gagan, Mertzanidis, Marios, Psomas, Alexandros, Wang, Di |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
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