GenTel-Safe: A Unified Benchmark and Shielding Framework for Defending Against Prompt Injection Attacks

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Li, Rongchang, Chen, Minjie, Hu, Chang, Chen, Han, Xing, Wenpeng, Han, Meng
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2024
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author Li, Rongchang
Chen, Minjie
Hu, Chang
Chen, Han
Xing, Wenpeng
Han, Meng
author_facet Li, Rongchang
Chen, Minjie
Hu, Chang
Chen, Han
Xing, Wenpeng
Han, Meng
contents Large Language Models (LLMs) like GPT-4, LLaMA, and Qwen have demonstrated remarkable success across a wide range of applications. However, these models remain inherently vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, which can bypass existing safety mechanisms, highlighting the urgent need for more robust attack detection methods and comprehensive evaluation benchmarks. To address these challenges, we introduce GenTel-Safe, a unified framework that includes a novel prompt injection attack detection method, GenTel-Shield, along with a comprehensive evaluation benchmark, GenTel-Bench, which compromises 84812 prompt injection attacks, spanning 3 major categories and 28 security scenarios. To prove the effectiveness of GenTel-Shield, we evaluate it together with vanilla safety guardrails against the GenTel-Bench dataset. Empirically, GenTel-Shield can achieve state-of-the-art attack detection success rates, which reveals the critical weakness of existing safeguarding techniques against harmful prompts. For reproducibility, we have made the code and benchmarking dataset available on the project page at https://gentellab.github.io/gentel-safe.github.io/.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2409_19521
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle GenTel-Safe: A Unified Benchmark and Shielding Framework for Defending Against Prompt Injection Attacks
Li, Rongchang
Chen, Minjie
Hu, Chang
Chen, Han
Xing, Wenpeng
Han, Meng
Cryptography and Security
Machine Learning
Large Language Models (LLMs) like GPT-4, LLaMA, and Qwen have demonstrated remarkable success across a wide range of applications. However, these models remain inherently vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, which can bypass existing safety mechanisms, highlighting the urgent need for more robust attack detection methods and comprehensive evaluation benchmarks. To address these challenges, we introduce GenTel-Safe, a unified framework that includes a novel prompt injection attack detection method, GenTel-Shield, along with a comprehensive evaluation benchmark, GenTel-Bench, which compromises 84812 prompt injection attacks, spanning 3 major categories and 28 security scenarios. To prove the effectiveness of GenTel-Shield, we evaluate it together with vanilla safety guardrails against the GenTel-Bench dataset. Empirically, GenTel-Shield can achieve state-of-the-art attack detection success rates, which reveals the critical weakness of existing safeguarding techniques against harmful prompts. For reproducibility, we have made the code and benchmarking dataset available on the project page at https://gentellab.github.io/gentel-safe.github.io/.
title GenTel-Safe: A Unified Benchmark and Shielding Framework for Defending Against Prompt Injection Attacks
topic Cryptography and Security
Machine Learning
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.19521