Optimal RANDAO Manipulation in Ethereum

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Alpturer, Kaya, Weinberg, S. Matthew
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
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author Alpturer, Kaya
Weinberg, S. Matthew
author_facet Alpturer, Kaya
Weinberg, S. Matthew
contents It is well-known that RANDAO manipulation is possible in Ethereum if an adversary controls the proposers assigned to the last slots in an epoch. We provide a methodology to compute, for any fraction $α$ of stake owned by an adversary, the maximum fraction $f(α)$ of rounds that a strategic adversary can propose. We further implement our methodology and compute $f(\cdot)$ for all $α$. For example, we conclude that an optimal strategic participant with $5\%$ of the stake can propose a $5.048\%$ fraction of rounds, $10\%$ of the stake can propose a $10.19\%$ fraction of rounds, and $20\%$ of the stake can propose a $20.68\%$ fraction of rounds.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2409_19883
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Optimal RANDAO Manipulation in Ethereum
Alpturer, Kaya
Weinberg, S. Matthew
Computer Science and Game Theory
Cryptography and Security
It is well-known that RANDAO manipulation is possible in Ethereum if an adversary controls the proposers assigned to the last slots in an epoch. We provide a methodology to compute, for any fraction $α$ of stake owned by an adversary, the maximum fraction $f(α)$ of rounds that a strategic adversary can propose. We further implement our methodology and compute $f(\cdot)$ for all $α$. For example, we conclude that an optimal strategic participant with $5\%$ of the stake can propose a $5.048\%$ fraction of rounds, $10\%$ of the stake can propose a $10.19\%$ fraction of rounds, and $20\%$ of the stake can propose a $20.68\%$ fraction of rounds.
title Optimal RANDAO Manipulation in Ethereum
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.19883