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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.00322 |
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| _version_ | 1866909331381813248 |
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| author | Vasconcelos, Marcos M. Câmara, Odilon |
| author_facet | Vasconcelos, Marcos M. Câmara, Odilon |
| contents | Social-media platforms are one of the most prevalent communication media today. In such systems, a large amount of content is generated and available to the platform. However, not all content can be transmitted to every possible user at all times. At the other end are the users, who have their own preferences about which content they enjoy, which is often unknown ex ante to the platform. We model the interaction between the platform and the users as a signaling game with asymmetric information, where each user optimizes its preference disclosure policy, and the platform optimizes its information disclosure policy. We provide structural as well as existence of policies that constitute Bayesian Nash Equilibria, and necessary optimality conditions used to explicitly compute the optimal policies. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2410_00322 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Strategic information disclosure with communication constraints and private preferences Vasconcelos, Marcos M. Câmara, Odilon Computer Science and Game Theory Systems and Control Social-media platforms are one of the most prevalent communication media today. In such systems, a large amount of content is generated and available to the platform. However, not all content can be transmitted to every possible user at all times. At the other end are the users, who have their own preferences about which content they enjoy, which is often unknown ex ante to the platform. We model the interaction between the platform and the users as a signaling game with asymmetric information, where each user optimizes its preference disclosure policy, and the platform optimizes its information disclosure policy. We provide structural as well as existence of policies that constitute Bayesian Nash Equilibria, and necessary optimality conditions used to explicitly compute the optimal policies. |
| title | Strategic information disclosure with communication constraints and private preferences |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Systems and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.00322 |