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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.00697 |
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| _version_ | 1866914961767268352 |
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| author | Cardonha, Carlos Bergman, David Cire, Andre Lozano, Leonardo Yunes, Tallys |
| author_facet | Cardonha, Carlos Bergman, David Cire, Andre Lozano, Leonardo Yunes, Tallys |
| contents | U.S. presidential elections are decided by the Electoral College, established in 1789, and designed to mitigate potential risks arising from the collusion of large groups of citizens. A statewide winner-take-all popular voting system for electors is implemented in all but two states, which has led to instances where narrow victories in key states were decisive in several recent elections. Small groups of voters can significantly impact the election, for example, through voter turnout. However, another dynamic can also influence this: a surprisingly small number of dedicated voters moving short distances across state lines. The extent to which the election's outcome is sensitive to small and well-coordinated movements of people has not been investigated in detail. Using a combination of forecasting, simulation, and optimization, we show that a candidate's probability of winning can be increased by 1% through the strategic relocation of approximately 10,000 people no farther than 100 miles from their current county of residence, less than 0.006% of the eligible voting population. Moreover, an 8% probability increase can be realized by a mere 50,000 voters relocating across state lines, or 0.03% of the voting population. Given the remarkably small number of people involved and the fact that establishing electoral residence in many states takes about a month, this coordinated relocation of voters is not nearly as challenging as previously thought. As it stands, U.S. presidential elections may be vulnerable to the exploitation of the aforementioned loophole. Therefore, we anticipate our findings will have direct consequences on policymaking and campaign strategy, as well as motivate new operations research methods within the political sciences. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2410_00697 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The Sensitivity of the U.S. Presidential Election to Coordinated Voter Relocation Cardonha, Carlos Bergman, David Cire, Andre Lozano, Leonardo Yunes, Tallys Physics and Society Optimization and Control 90-10 (Primary) U.S. presidential elections are decided by the Electoral College, established in 1789, and designed to mitigate potential risks arising from the collusion of large groups of citizens. A statewide winner-take-all popular voting system for electors is implemented in all but two states, which has led to instances where narrow victories in key states were decisive in several recent elections. Small groups of voters can significantly impact the election, for example, through voter turnout. However, another dynamic can also influence this: a surprisingly small number of dedicated voters moving short distances across state lines. The extent to which the election's outcome is sensitive to small and well-coordinated movements of people has not been investigated in detail. Using a combination of forecasting, simulation, and optimization, we show that a candidate's probability of winning can be increased by 1% through the strategic relocation of approximately 10,000 people no farther than 100 miles from their current county of residence, less than 0.006% of the eligible voting population. Moreover, an 8% probability increase can be realized by a mere 50,000 voters relocating across state lines, or 0.03% of the voting population. Given the remarkably small number of people involved and the fact that establishing electoral residence in many states takes about a month, this coordinated relocation of voters is not nearly as challenging as previously thought. As it stands, U.S. presidential elections may be vulnerable to the exploitation of the aforementioned loophole. Therefore, we anticipate our findings will have direct consequences on policymaking and campaign strategy, as well as motivate new operations research methods within the political sciences. |
| title | The Sensitivity of the U.S. Presidential Election to Coordinated Voter Relocation |
| topic | Physics and Society Optimization and Control 90-10 (Primary) |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.00697 |