The Value of Compromising Strategic Intent in General Lotto Games
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2024
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| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866912055129276416 |
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| author | Diaz-Garcia, Gilberto Paarporn, Keith Marden, Jason R. |
| author_facet | Diaz-Garcia, Gilberto Paarporn, Keith Marden, Jason R. |
| contents | Resource allocation in adversarial environments is a fundamental challenge across various domains, from corporate competition to military strategy. This article examines the impact of compromising an opponent's strategic intent in the context of General Lotto games, a class of resource allocation problems. We consider a scenario where one player, termed the "Breaker", has access to partial information about their opponent's strategy through a binary sensor. This sensor reveals whether the opponent's allocated resources exceed a certain threshold. Our analysis provides a comprehensive characterization of equilibrium strategies and payoffs for both players under this information structure. Through numerical studies, we demonstrate that the information provided by the sensor can significantly improve the Breaker's performance. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2410_01129 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The Value of Compromising Strategic Intent in General Lotto Games Diaz-Garcia, Gilberto Paarporn, Keith Marden, Jason R. Computer Science and Game Theory Resource allocation in adversarial environments is a fundamental challenge across various domains, from corporate competition to military strategy. This article examines the impact of compromising an opponent's strategic intent in the context of General Lotto games, a class of resource allocation problems. We consider a scenario where one player, termed the "Breaker", has access to partial information about their opponent's strategy through a binary sensor. This sensor reveals whether the opponent's allocated resources exceed a certain threshold. Our analysis provides a comprehensive characterization of equilibrium strategies and payoffs for both players under this information structure. Through numerical studies, we demonstrate that the information provided by the sensor can significantly improve the Breaker's performance. |
| title | The Value of Compromising Strategic Intent in General Lotto Games |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.01129 |