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Auction-Based Regulation for Artificial Intelligence

Fuente: arXiv

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux:	Bornstein, Marco, Che, Zora, Julapalli, Suhas, Mohamed, Abdirisak, Bedi, Amrit Singh, Huang, Furong
Format:	Preprint
Publié:	2024
Sujets:	Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence Computers and Society General Economics Economics
Accès en ligne:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Ajouter un tag Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!

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