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Proportionality in Multiple Dimensions to Design Electoral Systems

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Cembrano, Javier, Correa, José, Díaz, Gonzalo, Verdugo, Victor
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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