Chain-of-Jailbreak Attack for Image Generation Models via Editing Step by Step
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| _version_ | 1866916775919091712 |
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| author | Wang, Wenxuan Gao, Kuiyi Yuan, Youliang Huang, Jen-tse Liu, Qiuzhi Wang, Shuai Jiao, Wenxiang Tu, Zhaopeng |
| author_facet | Wang, Wenxuan Gao, Kuiyi Yuan, Youliang Huang, Jen-tse Liu, Qiuzhi Wang, Shuai Jiao, Wenxiang Tu, Zhaopeng |
| contents | Text-based image generation models, such as Stable Diffusion and DALL-E 3, hold significant potential in content creation and publishing workflows, making them the focus in recent years. Despite their remarkable capability to generate diverse and vivid images, considerable efforts are being made to prevent the generation of harmful content, such as abusive, violent, or pornographic material. To assess the safety of existing models, we introduce a novel jailbreaking method called Chain-of-Jailbreak (CoJ) attack, which compromises image generation models through a step-by-step editing process. Specifically, for malicious queries that cannot bypass the safeguards with a single prompt, we intentionally decompose the query into multiple sub-queries. The image generation models are then prompted to generate and iteratively edit images based on these sub-queries. To evaluate the effectiveness of our CoJ attack method, we constructed a comprehensive dataset, CoJ-Bench, encompassing nine safety scenarios, three types of editing operations, and three editing elements. Experiments on four widely-used image generation services provided by GPT-4V, GPT-4o, Gemini 1.5 and Gemini 1.5 Pro, demonstrate that our CoJ attack method can successfully bypass the safeguards of models for over 60% cases, which significantly outperforms other jailbreaking methods (i.e., 14%). Further, to enhance these models' safety against our CoJ attack method, we also propose an effective prompting-based method, Think Twice Prompting, that can successfully defend over 95% of CoJ attack. We release our dataset and code to facilitate the AI safety research. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2410_03869 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Chain-of-Jailbreak Attack for Image Generation Models via Editing Step by Step Wang, Wenxuan Gao, Kuiyi Yuan, Youliang Huang, Jen-tse Liu, Qiuzhi Wang, Shuai Jiao, Wenxiang Tu, Zhaopeng Computation and Language Artificial Intelligence Cryptography and Security Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Multimedia Text-based image generation models, such as Stable Diffusion and DALL-E 3, hold significant potential in content creation and publishing workflows, making them the focus in recent years. Despite their remarkable capability to generate diverse and vivid images, considerable efforts are being made to prevent the generation of harmful content, such as abusive, violent, or pornographic material. To assess the safety of existing models, we introduce a novel jailbreaking method called Chain-of-Jailbreak (CoJ) attack, which compromises image generation models through a step-by-step editing process. Specifically, for malicious queries that cannot bypass the safeguards with a single prompt, we intentionally decompose the query into multiple sub-queries. The image generation models are then prompted to generate and iteratively edit images based on these sub-queries. To evaluate the effectiveness of our CoJ attack method, we constructed a comprehensive dataset, CoJ-Bench, encompassing nine safety scenarios, three types of editing operations, and three editing elements. Experiments on four widely-used image generation services provided by GPT-4V, GPT-4o, Gemini 1.5 and Gemini 1.5 Pro, demonstrate that our CoJ attack method can successfully bypass the safeguards of models for over 60% cases, which significantly outperforms other jailbreaking methods (i.e., 14%). Further, to enhance these models' safety against our CoJ attack method, we also propose an effective prompting-based method, Think Twice Prompting, that can successfully defend over 95% of CoJ attack. We release our dataset and code to facilitate the AI safety research. |
| title | Chain-of-Jailbreak Attack for Image Generation Models via Editing Step by Step |
| topic | Computation and Language Artificial Intelligence Cryptography and Security Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Multimedia |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.03869 |