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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.04362 |
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| _version_ | 1866913574081789952 |
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| author | Manero, Jorge |
| author_facet | Manero, Jorge |
| contents | What is a physical theory? Although this intriguing question has been addressed from many different perspectives, some physicists and philosophers of physics have implicitly or explicitly embraced a philosophically-neutral definition of a physical theory, independently of the philosophical position endorsed with respect to it. Considering some objections against this view, I shall argue that the most appropriate definition of a physical theory already presupposes some commitments shared by a philosophical position associated with scientific realism. As we shall see, what physical theories and scientific realist positions have in common is the commitment of satisfying a non-factive notion of empirical adequacy, whilst a factive notion of empirical adequacy shall be solely associated with scientific realism. Based on this factive/non-factive distinction, we shall finally present a case study in physics in order to show that a well-known foundational problem associated with the concept of manifest time can be dissolved once the non-factive notion of empirical adequacy (as opposed to factive one) is endorsed. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2410_04362 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | What is a physical theory? Philosophers do have an answer by distinguishing two forms of empirical adequacy Manero, Jorge History and Philosophy of Physics What is a physical theory? Although this intriguing question has been addressed from many different perspectives, some physicists and philosophers of physics have implicitly or explicitly embraced a philosophically-neutral definition of a physical theory, independently of the philosophical position endorsed with respect to it. Considering some objections against this view, I shall argue that the most appropriate definition of a physical theory already presupposes some commitments shared by a philosophical position associated with scientific realism. As we shall see, what physical theories and scientific realist positions have in common is the commitment of satisfying a non-factive notion of empirical adequacy, whilst a factive notion of empirical adequacy shall be solely associated with scientific realism. Based on this factive/non-factive distinction, we shall finally present a case study in physics in order to show that a well-known foundational problem associated with the concept of manifest time can be dissolved once the non-factive notion of empirical adequacy (as opposed to factive one) is endorsed. |
| title | What is a physical theory? Philosophers do have an answer by distinguishing two forms of empirical adequacy |
| topic | History and Philosophy of Physics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.04362 |