Persuasion with Ambiguous Communication

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Cheng, Xiaoyu, Klibanoff, Peter, Mukerji, Sujoy, Renou, Ludovic
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
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author Cheng, Xiaoyu
Klibanoff, Peter
Mukerji, Sujoy
Renou, Ludovic
author_facet Cheng, Xiaoyu
Klibanoff, Peter
Mukerji, Sujoy
Renou, Ludovic
contents We explore whether ambiguous communication can be beneficial to the sender in a persuasion problem, when the receiver (and possibly the sender) is ambiguity averse. Our analysis highlights the necessity of using a collection of experiments that form a splitting of an obedient experiment. Some experiments in the collection must be Pareto-ranked in that both players agree on their payoff ranking. If an optimal Bayesian persuasion experiment can be split in this way, then any not-too-ambiguity-averse sender as well as the receiver benefit. There are no benefits when the receiver has only two actions.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2410_05504
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Persuasion with Ambiguous Communication
Cheng, Xiaoyu
Klibanoff, Peter
Mukerji, Sujoy
Renou, Ludovic
Theoretical Economics
We explore whether ambiguous communication can be beneficial to the sender in a persuasion problem, when the receiver (and possibly the sender) is ambiguity averse. Our analysis highlights the necessity of using a collection of experiments that form a splitting of an obedient experiment. Some experiments in the collection must be Pareto-ranked in that both players agree on their payoff ranking. If an optimal Bayesian persuasion experiment can be split in this way, then any not-too-ambiguity-averse sender as well as the receiver benefit. There are no benefits when the receiver has only two actions.
title Persuasion with Ambiguous Communication
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.05504