On the Minimal Theory of Consciousness Implicit in Active Inference
Fuente:
arXiv
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , , , , , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866913893039734784 |
|---|---|
| author | Whyte, Christopher J. Corcoran, Andrew W. Robinson, Jonathan Smith, Ryan Moran, Rosalyn J. Parr, Thomas Friston, Karl J. Seth, Anil K. Hohwy, Jakob |
| author_facet | Whyte, Christopher J. Corcoran, Andrew W. Robinson, Jonathan Smith, Ryan Moran, Rosalyn J. Parr, Thomas Friston, Karl J. Seth, Anil K. Hohwy, Jakob |
| contents | The multifaceted nature of subjective experience poses a challenge to the study of consciousness. Traditional neuroscientific approaches often concentrate on isolated facets, such as perceptual awareness or the global state of consciousness and construct a theory around the relevant empirical paradigms and findings. Theories of consciousness are, therefore, often difficult to compare; indeed, there might be little overlap in the phenomena such theories aim to explain. Here, we take a different approach: starting with active inference, a first principles framework for modelling behaviour as (approximate) Bayesian inference, and building up to a minimal theory of consciousness, which emerges from the shared features of computational models derived under active inference. We review a body of work applying active inference models to the study of consciousness and argue that there is implicit in all these models a small set of theoretical commitments that point to a minimal (and testable) theory of consciousness. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2410_06633 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | On the Minimal Theory of Consciousness Implicit in Active Inference Whyte, Christopher J. Corcoran, Andrew W. Robinson, Jonathan Smith, Ryan Moran, Rosalyn J. Parr, Thomas Friston, Karl J. Seth, Anil K. Hohwy, Jakob Neurons and Cognition The multifaceted nature of subjective experience poses a challenge to the study of consciousness. Traditional neuroscientific approaches often concentrate on isolated facets, such as perceptual awareness or the global state of consciousness and construct a theory around the relevant empirical paradigms and findings. Theories of consciousness are, therefore, often difficult to compare; indeed, there might be little overlap in the phenomena such theories aim to explain. Here, we take a different approach: starting with active inference, a first principles framework for modelling behaviour as (approximate) Bayesian inference, and building up to a minimal theory of consciousness, which emerges from the shared features of computational models derived under active inference. We review a body of work applying active inference models to the study of consciousness and argue that there is implicit in all these models a small set of theoretical commitments that point to a minimal (and testable) theory of consciousness. |
| title | On the Minimal Theory of Consciousness Implicit in Active Inference |
| topic | Neurons and Cognition |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.06633 |