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Revisiting the Primitives of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Ganesh, Aadityan, Thomas, Clayton, Weinberg, S. Matthew
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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