Poison-splat: Computation Cost Attack on 3D Gaussian Splatting

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Lu, Jiahao, Zhang, Yifan, Shen, Qiuhong, Wang, Xinchao, Yan, Shuicheng
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
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author Lu, Jiahao
Zhang, Yifan
Shen, Qiuhong
Wang, Xinchao
Yan, Shuicheng
author_facet Lu, Jiahao
Zhang, Yifan
Shen, Qiuhong
Wang, Xinchao
Yan, Shuicheng
contents 3D Gaussian splatting (3DGS), known for its groundbreaking performance and efficiency, has become a dominant 3D representation and brought progress to many 3D vision tasks. However, in this work, we reveal a significant security vulnerability that has been largely overlooked in 3DGS: the computation cost of training 3DGS could be maliciously tampered by poisoning the input data. By developing an attack named Poison-splat, we reveal a novel attack surface where the adversary can poison the input images to drastically increase the computation memory and time needed for 3DGS training, pushing the algorithm towards its worst computation complexity. In extreme cases, the attack can even consume all allocable memory, leading to a Denial-of-Service (DoS) that disrupts servers, resulting in practical damages to real-world 3DGS service vendors. Such a computation cost attack is achieved by addressing a bi-level optimization problem through three tailored strategies: attack objective approximation, proxy model rendering, and optional constrained optimization. These strategies not only ensure the effectiveness of our attack but also make it difficult to defend with simple defensive measures. We hope the revelation of this novel attack surface can spark attention to this crucial yet overlooked vulnerability of 3DGS systems. Our code is available at https://github.com/jiahaolu97/poison-splat .
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2410_08190
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Poison-splat: Computation Cost Attack on 3D Gaussian Splatting
Lu, Jiahao
Zhang, Yifan
Shen, Qiuhong
Wang, Xinchao
Yan, Shuicheng
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
Cryptography and Security
Graphics
Machine Learning
3D Gaussian splatting (3DGS), known for its groundbreaking performance and efficiency, has become a dominant 3D representation and brought progress to many 3D vision tasks. However, in this work, we reveal a significant security vulnerability that has been largely overlooked in 3DGS: the computation cost of training 3DGS could be maliciously tampered by poisoning the input data. By developing an attack named Poison-splat, we reveal a novel attack surface where the adversary can poison the input images to drastically increase the computation memory and time needed for 3DGS training, pushing the algorithm towards its worst computation complexity. In extreme cases, the attack can even consume all allocable memory, leading to a Denial-of-Service (DoS) that disrupts servers, resulting in practical damages to real-world 3DGS service vendors. Such a computation cost attack is achieved by addressing a bi-level optimization problem through three tailored strategies: attack objective approximation, proxy model rendering, and optional constrained optimization. These strategies not only ensure the effectiveness of our attack but also make it difficult to defend with simple defensive measures. We hope the revelation of this novel attack surface can spark attention to this crucial yet overlooked vulnerability of 3DGS systems. Our code is available at https://github.com/jiahaolu97/poison-splat .
title Poison-splat: Computation Cost Attack on 3D Gaussian Splatting
topic Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
Cryptography and Security
Graphics
Machine Learning
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.08190