Best-of-Both-Worlds Fairness of the Envy-Cycle-Elimination Algorithm

Fuente: arXiv
Salvato in:
Dettagli Bibliografici
Autori principali: Garg, Jugal, Sharma, Eklavya
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2024
Soggetti:
Accesso online:
Tags: Aggiungi Tag
Nessun Tag, puoi essere il primo ad aggiungerne!!
_version_ 1866929538175336448
author Garg, Jugal
Sharma, Eklavya
author_facet Garg, Jugal
Sharma, Eklavya
contents We consider the problem of fairly dividing indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. It is known that an Epistemic EFX and $2/3$-MMS allocation can be obtained using the Envy-Cycle-Elimination (ECE) algorithm. In this work, we explore whether this algorithm can be randomized to also ensure ex-ante proportionality. For two agents, we show that a randomized variant of ECE can compute an ex-post EFX and ex-ante envy-free allocation in near-linear time. However, for three agents, we show that several natural randomization methods for ECE fail to achieve ex-ante proportionality.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2410_08986
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Best-of-Both-Worlds Fairness of the Envy-Cycle-Elimination Algorithm
Garg, Jugal
Sharma, Eklavya
Computer Science and Game Theory
We consider the problem of fairly dividing indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. It is known that an Epistemic EFX and $2/3$-MMS allocation can be obtained using the Envy-Cycle-Elimination (ECE) algorithm. In this work, we explore whether this algorithm can be randomized to also ensure ex-ante proportionality. For two agents, we show that a randomized variant of ECE can compute an ex-post EFX and ex-ante envy-free allocation in near-linear time. However, for three agents, we show that several natural randomization methods for ECE fail to achieve ex-ante proportionality.
title Best-of-Both-Worlds Fairness of the Envy-Cycle-Elimination Algorithm
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.08986