Federated Learning for Data Market: Shapley-UCB for Seller Selection and Incentives
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| _version_ | 1866914971263172608 |
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| author | Chen, Kongyang Xu, Zeming |
| author_facet | Chen, Kongyang Xu, Zeming |
| contents | In recent years, research on the data trading market has been continuously deepened. In the transaction process, there is an information asymmetry process between agents and sellers. For sellers, direct data delivery faces the risk of privacy leakage. At the same time, sellers are not willing to provide data. A reasonable compensation method is needed to encourage sellers to provide data resources. For agents, the quality of data provided by sellers needs to be examined and evaluated. Otherwise, agents may consume too much cost and resources by recruiting sellers with poor data quality. Therefore, it is necessary to build a complete delivery process for the interaction between sellers and agents in the trading market so that the needs of sellers and agents can be met. The federated learning architecture is widely used in the data market due to its good privacy protection. Therefore, in this work, in response to the above challenges, we propose a transaction framework based on the federated learning architecture, and design a seller selection algorithm and incentive compensation mechanism. Specifically, we use gradient similarity and Shapley algorithm to fairly and accurately evaluate the contribution of sellers, and use the modified UCB algorithm to select sellers. After the training, fair compensation is made according to the seller's participation in the training. In view of the above work, we designed reasonable experiments for demonstration and obtained results, proving the rationality and effectiveness of the framework. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2410_09107 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Federated Learning for Data Market: Shapley-UCB for Seller Selection and Incentives Chen, Kongyang Xu, Zeming Machine Learning Artificial Intelligence Computer Science and Game Theory In recent years, research on the data trading market has been continuously deepened. In the transaction process, there is an information asymmetry process between agents and sellers. For sellers, direct data delivery faces the risk of privacy leakage. At the same time, sellers are not willing to provide data. A reasonable compensation method is needed to encourage sellers to provide data resources. For agents, the quality of data provided by sellers needs to be examined and evaluated. Otherwise, agents may consume too much cost and resources by recruiting sellers with poor data quality. Therefore, it is necessary to build a complete delivery process for the interaction between sellers and agents in the trading market so that the needs of sellers and agents can be met. The federated learning architecture is widely used in the data market due to its good privacy protection. Therefore, in this work, in response to the above challenges, we propose a transaction framework based on the federated learning architecture, and design a seller selection algorithm and incentive compensation mechanism. Specifically, we use gradient similarity and Shapley algorithm to fairly and accurately evaluate the contribution of sellers, and use the modified UCB algorithm to select sellers. After the training, fair compensation is made according to the seller's participation in the training. In view of the above work, we designed reasonable experiments for demonstration and obtained results, proving the rationality and effectiveness of the framework. |
| title | Federated Learning for Data Market: Shapley-UCB for Seller Selection and Incentives |
| topic | Machine Learning Artificial Intelligence Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.09107 |