On Goodhart's law, with an application to value alignment

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: El-Mhamdi, El-Mahdi, Hoang, Lê-Nguyên
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
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author El-Mhamdi, El-Mahdi
Hoang, Lê-Nguyên
author_facet El-Mhamdi, El-Mahdi
Hoang, Lê-Nguyên
contents ``When a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure'', this adage is known as {\it Goodhart's law}. In this paper, we investigate formally this law and prove that it critically depends on the tail distribution of the discrepancy between the true goal and the measure that is optimized. Discrepancies with long-tail distributions favor a Goodhart's law, that is, the optimization of the measure can have a counter-productive effect on the goal. We provide a formal setting to assess Goodhart's law by studying the asymptotic behavior of the correlation between the goal and the measure, as the measure is optimized. Moreover, we introduce a distinction between a {\it weak} Goodhart's law, when over-optimizing the metric is useless for the true goal, and a {\it strong} Goodhart's law, when over-optimizing the metric is harmful for the true goal. A distinction which we prove to depend on the tail distribution. We stress the implications of this result to large-scale decision making and policies that are (and have to be) based on metrics, and propose numerous research directions to better assess the safety of such policies in general, and to the particularly concerning case where these policies are automated with algorithms.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2410_09638
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle On Goodhart's law, with an application to value alignment
El-Mhamdi, El-Mahdi
Hoang, Lê-Nguyên
Machine Learning
Artificial Intelligence
Statistics Theory
``When a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure'', this adage is known as {\it Goodhart's law}. In this paper, we investigate formally this law and prove that it critically depends on the tail distribution of the discrepancy between the true goal and the measure that is optimized. Discrepancies with long-tail distributions favor a Goodhart's law, that is, the optimization of the measure can have a counter-productive effect on the goal. We provide a formal setting to assess Goodhart's law by studying the asymptotic behavior of the correlation between the goal and the measure, as the measure is optimized. Moreover, we introduce a distinction between a {\it weak} Goodhart's law, when over-optimizing the metric is useless for the true goal, and a {\it strong} Goodhart's law, when over-optimizing the metric is harmful for the true goal. A distinction which we prove to depend on the tail distribution. We stress the implications of this result to large-scale decision making and policies that are (and have to be) based on metrics, and propose numerous research directions to better assess the safety of such policies in general, and to the particularly concerning case where these policies are automated with algorithms.
title On Goodhart's law, with an application to value alignment
topic Machine Learning
Artificial Intelligence
Statistics Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.09638