The Age of DDoScovery: An Empirical Comparison of Industry and Academic DDoS Assessments
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| Main Authors: | , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| _version_ | 1866917812141817856 |
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| author | Hiesgen, Raphael Nawrocki, Marcin Barcellos, Marinho Kopp, Daniel Hohlfeld, Oliver Chan, Echo Dobbins, Roland Doerr, Christian Rossow, Christian Thomas, Daniel R. Jonker, Mattijs Mok, Ricky Luo, Xiapu Kristoff, John Schmidt, Thomas C. Wählisch, Matthias claffy, kc |
| author_facet | Hiesgen, Raphael Nawrocki, Marcin Barcellos, Marinho Kopp, Daniel Hohlfeld, Oliver Chan, Echo Dobbins, Roland Doerr, Christian Rossow, Christian Thomas, Daniel R. Jonker, Mattijs Mok, Ricky Luo, Xiapu Kristoff, John Schmidt, Thomas C. Wählisch, Matthias claffy, kc |
| contents | Motivated by the impressive but diffuse scope of DDoS research and reporting, we undertake a multistakeholder (joint industry-academic) analysis to seek convergence across the best available macroscopic views of the relative trends in two dominant classes of attacks - direct-path attacks and reflection-amplification attacks. We first analyze 24 industry reports to extract trends and (in)consistencies across observations by commercial stakeholders in 2022. We then analyze ten data sets spanning industry and academic sources, across four years (2019-2023), to find and explain discrepancies based on data sources, vantage points, methods, and parameters. Our method includes a new approach: we share an aggregated list of DDoS targets with industry players who return the results of joining this list with their proprietary data sources to reveal gaps in visibility of the academic data sources. We use academic data sources to explore an industry-reported relative drop in spoofed reflection-amplification attacks in 2021-2022. Our study illustrates the value, but also the challenge, in independent validation of security-related properties of Internet infrastructure. Finally, we reflect on opportunities to facilitate greater common understanding of the DDoS landscape. We hope our results inform not only future academic and industry pursuits but also emerging policy efforts to reduce systemic Internet security vulnerabilities. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2410_11708 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The Age of DDoScovery: An Empirical Comparison of Industry and Academic DDoS Assessments Hiesgen, Raphael Nawrocki, Marcin Barcellos, Marinho Kopp, Daniel Hohlfeld, Oliver Chan, Echo Dobbins, Roland Doerr, Christian Rossow, Christian Thomas, Daniel R. Jonker, Mattijs Mok, Ricky Luo, Xiapu Kristoff, John Schmidt, Thomas C. Wählisch, Matthias claffy, kc Cryptography and Security Motivated by the impressive but diffuse scope of DDoS research and reporting, we undertake a multistakeholder (joint industry-academic) analysis to seek convergence across the best available macroscopic views of the relative trends in two dominant classes of attacks - direct-path attacks and reflection-amplification attacks. We first analyze 24 industry reports to extract trends and (in)consistencies across observations by commercial stakeholders in 2022. We then analyze ten data sets spanning industry and academic sources, across four years (2019-2023), to find and explain discrepancies based on data sources, vantage points, methods, and parameters. Our method includes a new approach: we share an aggregated list of DDoS targets with industry players who return the results of joining this list with their proprietary data sources to reveal gaps in visibility of the academic data sources. We use academic data sources to explore an industry-reported relative drop in spoofed reflection-amplification attacks in 2021-2022. Our study illustrates the value, but also the challenge, in independent validation of security-related properties of Internet infrastructure. Finally, we reflect on opportunities to facilitate greater common understanding of the DDoS landscape. We hope our results inform not only future academic and industry pursuits but also emerging policy efforts to reduce systemic Internet security vulnerabilities. |
| title | The Age of DDoScovery: An Empirical Comparison of Industry and Academic DDoS Assessments |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.11708 |