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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.14825 |
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| _version_ | 1866910657133150208 |
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| author | Liu, Zhi Garg, Nikhil |
| author_facet | Liu, Zhi Garg, Nikhil |
| contents | We consider government service allocation -- how the government allocates resources (e.g., maintenance of public infrastructure) over time. It is important to make these decisions efficiently and equitably -- though these desiderata may conflict. In particular, we consider the design of Service Level Agreements (SLA) in city government operations: promises that incidents such as potholes and fallen trees will be responded to within a certain time. We model the problem of designing a set of SLAs as an optimization problem with equity and efficiency objectives under a queuing network framework; the city has two decision levers: how to allocate response budgets to different neighborhoods, and how to schedule responses to individual incidents. We: (1) Theoretically analyze a stylized model and find that the "price of equity" is small in realistic settings; (2) Develop a simulation-optimization framework to optimize policies in practice; (3) Apply our framework empirically using data from NYC, finding that: (a) status quo inspections are highly inefficient and inequitable compared to optimal ones, and (b) in practice, the equity-efficiency trade-off is not substantial: generally, inefficient policies are inequitable, and vice versa. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2410_14825 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Redesigning Service Level Agreements: Equity and Efficiency in City Government Operations Liu, Zhi Garg, Nikhil Computers and Society We consider government service allocation -- how the government allocates resources (e.g., maintenance of public infrastructure) over time. It is important to make these decisions efficiently and equitably -- though these desiderata may conflict. In particular, we consider the design of Service Level Agreements (SLA) in city government operations: promises that incidents such as potholes and fallen trees will be responded to within a certain time. We model the problem of designing a set of SLAs as an optimization problem with equity and efficiency objectives under a queuing network framework; the city has two decision levers: how to allocate response budgets to different neighborhoods, and how to schedule responses to individual incidents. We: (1) Theoretically analyze a stylized model and find that the "price of equity" is small in realistic settings; (2) Develop a simulation-optimization framework to optimize policies in practice; (3) Apply our framework empirically using data from NYC, finding that: (a) status quo inspections are highly inefficient and inequitable compared to optimal ones, and (b) in practice, the equity-efficiency trade-off is not substantial: generally, inefficient policies are inequitable, and vice versa. |
| title | Redesigning Service Level Agreements: Equity and Efficiency in City Government Operations |
| topic | Computers and Society |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.14825 |