Enhancing Prompt Injection Attacks to LLMs via Poisoning Alignment
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arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866912585128869888 |
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| author | Shao, Zedian Liu, Hongbin Mu, Jaden Gong, Neil Zhenqiang |
| author_facet | Shao, Zedian Liu, Hongbin Mu, Jaden Gong, Neil Zhenqiang |
| contents | Prompt injection attack, where an attacker injects a prompt into the original one, aiming to make an Large Language Model (LLM) follow the injected prompt to perform an attacker-chosen task, represent a critical security threat. Existing attacks primarily focus on crafting these injections at inference time, treating the LLM itself as a static target. Our experiments show that these attacks achieve some success, but there is still significant room for improvement. In this work, we introduces a more foundational attack vector: poisoning the LLM's alignment process to amplify the success of future prompt injection attacks. Specifically, we propose PoisonedAlign, a method that strategically creates poisoned alignment samples to poison an LLM's alignment dataset. Our experiments across five LLMs and two alignment datasets show that when even a small fraction of the alignment data is poisoned, the resulting model becomes substantially more vulnerable to a wide range of prompt injection attacks. Crucially, this vulnerability is instilled while the LLM's performance on standard capability benchmarks remains largely unchanged, making the manipulation difficult to detect through automated, general-purpose performance evaluations. The code for implementing the attack is available at https://github.com/Sadcardation/PoisonedAlign. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2410_14827 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Enhancing Prompt Injection Attacks to LLMs via Poisoning Alignment Shao, Zedian Liu, Hongbin Mu, Jaden Gong, Neil Zhenqiang Cryptography and Security Artificial Intelligence Computation and Language Machine Learning Prompt injection attack, where an attacker injects a prompt into the original one, aiming to make an Large Language Model (LLM) follow the injected prompt to perform an attacker-chosen task, represent a critical security threat. Existing attacks primarily focus on crafting these injections at inference time, treating the LLM itself as a static target. Our experiments show that these attacks achieve some success, but there is still significant room for improvement. In this work, we introduces a more foundational attack vector: poisoning the LLM's alignment process to amplify the success of future prompt injection attacks. Specifically, we propose PoisonedAlign, a method that strategically creates poisoned alignment samples to poison an LLM's alignment dataset. Our experiments across five LLMs and two alignment datasets show that when even a small fraction of the alignment data is poisoned, the resulting model becomes substantially more vulnerable to a wide range of prompt injection attacks. Crucially, this vulnerability is instilled while the LLM's performance on standard capability benchmarks remains largely unchanged, making the manipulation difficult to detect through automated, general-purpose performance evaluations. The code for implementing the attack is available at https://github.com/Sadcardation/PoisonedAlign. |
| title | Enhancing Prompt Injection Attacks to LLMs via Poisoning Alignment |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Artificial Intelligence Computation and Language Machine Learning |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.14827 |