Approximate Feedback Nash Equilibria with Sparse Inter-Agent Dependencies

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Liu, Xinjie, Li, Jingqi, Fotiadis, Filippos, Karabag, Mustafa O., Milzman, Jesse, Fridovich-Keil, David, Topcu, Ufuk
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2024
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author Liu, Xinjie
Li, Jingqi
Fotiadis, Filippos
Karabag, Mustafa O.
Milzman, Jesse
Fridovich-Keil, David
Topcu, Ufuk
author_facet Liu, Xinjie
Li, Jingqi
Fotiadis, Filippos
Karabag, Mustafa O.
Milzman, Jesse
Fridovich-Keil, David
Topcu, Ufuk
contents Feedback Nash equilibrium strategies in multi-agent dynamic games require availability of all players' state information to compute control actions. However, in real-world scenarios, sensing and communication limitations between agents make full state feedback expensive or impractical, and such strategies can become fragile when state information from other agents is inaccurate. To this end, we propose a regularized dynamic programming approach for finding sparse feedback policies that selectively depend on the states of a subset of agents in dynamic games. The proposed approach solves convex adaptive group Lasso problems to compute sparse policies approximating Nash equilibrium solutions. We prove the regularized solutions' asymptotic convergence to a neighborhood of Nash equilibrium policies in linear-quadratic (LQ) games. Further, we extend the proposed approach to general non-LQ games via an iterative algorithm. Simulation results in multi-robot interaction scenarios show that the proposed approach effectively computes feedback policies with varying sparsity levels. When agents have noisy observations of other agents' states, simulation results indicate that the proposed regularized policies consistently achieve lower costs than standard Nash equilibrium policies by up to 77% for all interacting agents whose costs are coupled with other agents' states.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2410_16441
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Approximate Feedback Nash Equilibria with Sparse Inter-Agent Dependencies
Liu, Xinjie
Li, Jingqi
Fotiadis, Filippos
Karabag, Mustafa O.
Milzman, Jesse
Fridovich-Keil, David
Topcu, Ufuk
Computer Science and Game Theory
Multiagent Systems
Robotics
Systems and Control
Feedback Nash equilibrium strategies in multi-agent dynamic games require availability of all players' state information to compute control actions. However, in real-world scenarios, sensing and communication limitations between agents make full state feedback expensive or impractical, and such strategies can become fragile when state information from other agents is inaccurate. To this end, we propose a regularized dynamic programming approach for finding sparse feedback policies that selectively depend on the states of a subset of agents in dynamic games. The proposed approach solves convex adaptive group Lasso problems to compute sparse policies approximating Nash equilibrium solutions. We prove the regularized solutions' asymptotic convergence to a neighborhood of Nash equilibrium policies in linear-quadratic (LQ) games. Further, we extend the proposed approach to general non-LQ games via an iterative algorithm. Simulation results in multi-robot interaction scenarios show that the proposed approach effectively computes feedback policies with varying sparsity levels. When agents have noisy observations of other agents' states, simulation results indicate that the proposed regularized policies consistently achieve lower costs than standard Nash equilibrium policies by up to 77% for all interacting agents whose costs are coupled with other agents' states.
title Approximate Feedback Nash Equilibria with Sparse Inter-Agent Dependencies
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
Multiagent Systems
Robotics
Systems and Control
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.16441