(Quantum) Indifferentiability and Pre-Computation
Fuente:
arXiv
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2024
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| _version_ | 1866910660265246720 |
|---|---|
| author | Carolan, Joseph Poremba, Alexander Zhandry, Mark |
| author_facet | Carolan, Joseph Poremba, Alexander Zhandry, Mark |
| contents | Indifferentiability is a popular cryptographic paradigm for analyzing the security of ideal objects -- both in a classical as well as in a quantum world. It is typically stated in the form of a composable and simulation-based definition, and captures what it means for a construction (e.g., a cryptographic hash function) to be ``as good as'' an ideal object (e.g., a random oracle). Despite its strength, indifferentiability is not known to offer security against pre-processing attacks in which the adversary gains access to (classical or quantum) advice that is relevant to the particular construction. In this work, we show that indifferentiability is (generically) insufficient for capturing pre-computation. To accommodate this shortcoming, we propose a strengthening of indifferentiability which is not only composable but also takes arbitrary pre-computation into account. As an application, we show that the one-round sponge is indifferentiable (with pre-computation) from a random oracle. This yields the first (and tight) classical/quantum space-time trade-off for one-round sponge inversion. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2410_16595 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | (Quantum) Indifferentiability and Pre-Computation Carolan, Joseph Poremba, Alexander Zhandry, Mark Quantum Physics Cryptography and Security Indifferentiability is a popular cryptographic paradigm for analyzing the security of ideal objects -- both in a classical as well as in a quantum world. It is typically stated in the form of a composable and simulation-based definition, and captures what it means for a construction (e.g., a cryptographic hash function) to be ``as good as'' an ideal object (e.g., a random oracle). Despite its strength, indifferentiability is not known to offer security against pre-processing attacks in which the adversary gains access to (classical or quantum) advice that is relevant to the particular construction. In this work, we show that indifferentiability is (generically) insufficient for capturing pre-computation. To accommodate this shortcoming, we propose a strengthening of indifferentiability which is not only composable but also takes arbitrary pre-computation into account. As an application, we show that the one-round sponge is indifferentiable (with pre-computation) from a random oracle. This yields the first (and tight) classical/quantum space-time trade-off for one-round sponge inversion. |
| title | (Quantum) Indifferentiability and Pre-Computation |
| topic | Quantum Physics Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.16595 |