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Gains-from-Trade in Bilateral Trade with a Broker

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Hajiaghayi, Ilya, Hajiaghayi, MohammadTaghi, Peng, Gary, Shin, Suho
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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