Commitment and Randomization in Communication
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arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866912705580892160 |
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| author | Kamenica, Emir Lin, Xiao |
| author_facet | Kamenica, Emir Lin, Xiao |
| contents | When does Sender, in a Sender-Receiver game, strictly value commitment? In a setting with finitely many actions and states, we establish that, generically, commitment has no value if and only if a partitional experiment is optimal. Moreover, if Sender's preferred cheap-talk equilibrium necessarily involves randomization, then Sender values commitment. Our results imply that if a school values commitment to a grading policy, then the school necessarily prefers to grade unfairly. We also ask: for what share of preference profiles does commitment have no value? For any state space, if there are $\left|A\right|$ actions, the share is at least $\frac{1}{\left|A\right|^{\left|A\right|}}$. As the number of states grows large, the share converges precisely to $\frac{1}{\left|A\right|^{\left|A\right|}}$. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2410_17503 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Commitment and Randomization in Communication Kamenica, Emir Lin, Xiao Theoretical Economics When does Sender, in a Sender-Receiver game, strictly value commitment? In a setting with finitely many actions and states, we establish that, generically, commitment has no value if and only if a partitional experiment is optimal. Moreover, if Sender's preferred cheap-talk equilibrium necessarily involves randomization, then Sender values commitment. Our results imply that if a school values commitment to a grading policy, then the school necessarily prefers to grade unfairly. We also ask: for what share of preference profiles does commitment have no value? For any state space, if there are $\left|A\right|$ actions, the share is at least $\frac{1}{\left|A\right|^{\left|A\right|}}$. As the number of states grows large, the share converges precisely to $\frac{1}{\left|A\right|^{\left|A\right|}}$. |
| title | Commitment and Randomization in Communication |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.17503 |