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Local hedging approximately solves Pandora's box problems with nonobligatory inspection

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Scully, Ziv, Doval, Laura
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics Probability
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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