Quantifying the Value of Revert Protection
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866909488270802944 |
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| author | Zhu, Brian Z. Wan, Xin Moallemi, Ciamac C. Robinson, Dan Bachu, Brad |
| author_facet | Zhu, Brian Z. Wan, Xin Moallemi, Ciamac C. Robinson, Dan Bachu, Brad |
| contents | Revert protection is a feature provided by some blockchain platforms that prevents users from incurring fees for failed transactions. We study the economic implications and benefits of revert protection in the context of priority gas auctions and maximal extractable value. We develop a model in which searchers bid for a top-of-block arbitrage opportunity under varying degrees of revert protection. This model applies to a broad range of settings, including bundle auctions on L1s and priority ordering sequencing rules on L2s. We quantify, in closed form, how revert protection improves equilibrium auction revenue, market efficiency, and blockspace efficiency. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2410_19106 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Quantifying the Value of Revert Protection Zhu, Brian Z. Wan, Xin Moallemi, Ciamac C. Robinson, Dan Bachu, Brad Computer Science and Game Theory Revert protection is a feature provided by some blockchain platforms that prevents users from incurring fees for failed transactions. We study the economic implications and benefits of revert protection in the context of priority gas auctions and maximal extractable value. We develop a model in which searchers bid for a top-of-block arbitrage opportunity under varying degrees of revert protection. This model applies to a broad range of settings, including bundle auctions on L1s and priority ordering sequencing rules on L2s. We quantify, in closed form, how revert protection improves equilibrium auction revenue, market efficiency, and blockspace efficiency. |
| title | Quantifying the Value of Revert Protection |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.19106 |