Strategic Control of Facial Expressions by the Fed Chair

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Author: Ng, Hunter
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
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_version_ 1866929561326845952
author Ng, Hunter
author_facet Ng, Hunter
contents This article investigates whether the Federal Reserve Chair strategically controls facial expressions during FOMC press conferences and how these nonverbal cues affect financial markets. I use facial recognition technology on videos of press conferences from April 2011 to December 2020 to quantify changes in the Chair's nonverbal signals. Results show that facial expressions serve as a separate public signal, distinct from verbal content. Using deepfakes, I find that the same facial expressions expressed by different Fed Chairs are interpreted differentially. As their tenure increases, negative expressions become more frequent, eliciting adverse market reactions. Furthermore, the markets interpretation of these expressions evolves over time, suggesting that investors process facial cues with dual-processing finite-state Markov memory. In line with the Fed's goals of transparency and non-volatility, I find that Fed Chairs do not strategically control their expressions.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2410_20214
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Strategic Control of Facial Expressions by the Fed Chair
Ng, Hunter
General Economics
Economics
91Gxx, 91B84, 91B64, 91G10, 91B50, 91B72, 91G50, 62P20, 91E30
This article investigates whether the Federal Reserve Chair strategically controls facial expressions during FOMC press conferences and how these nonverbal cues affect financial markets. I use facial recognition technology on videos of press conferences from April 2011 to December 2020 to quantify changes in the Chair's nonverbal signals. Results show that facial expressions serve as a separate public signal, distinct from verbal content. Using deepfakes, I find that the same facial expressions expressed by different Fed Chairs are interpreted differentially. As their tenure increases, negative expressions become more frequent, eliciting adverse market reactions. Furthermore, the markets interpretation of these expressions evolves over time, suggesting that investors process facial cues with dual-processing finite-state Markov memory. In line with the Fed's goals of transparency and non-volatility, I find that Fed Chairs do not strategically control their expressions.
title Strategic Control of Facial Expressions by the Fed Chair
topic General Economics
Economics
91Gxx, 91B84, 91B64, 91G10, 91B50, 91B72, 91G50, 62P20, 91E30
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.20214