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Autores principales: Benfield, David, Coniglio, Stefano, Kunc, Martin, Vuong, Phan Tu, Zemkoho, Alain
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2024
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Acceso en línea:https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.20284
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author Benfield, David
Coniglio, Stefano
Kunc, Martin
Vuong, Phan Tu
Zemkoho, Alain
author_facet Benfield, David
Coniglio, Stefano
Kunc, Martin
Vuong, Phan Tu
Zemkoho, Alain
contents Adversarial machine learning concerns situations in which learners face attacks from active adversaries. Such scenarios arise in applications such as spam email filtering, malware detection and fake-image generation, where security methods must be actively updated to keep up with the ever improving generation of malicious data.We model these interactions between the learner and the adversary as a game and formulate the problem as a pessimistic bilevel optimisation problem with the learner taking the role of the leader. The adversary, modelled as a stochastic data generator, takes the role of the follower, generating data in response to the classifier. While existing models rely on the assumption that the adversary will choose the least costly solution leading to a convex lower-level problem with a unique solution, we present a novel model and solution method which do not make such assumptions. We compare these to the existing approach and see significant improvements in performance suggesting that relaxing these assumptions leads to a more realistic model.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2410_20284
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Classification under strategic adversary manipulation using pessimistic bilevel optimisation
Benfield, David
Coniglio, Stefano
Kunc, Martin
Vuong, Phan Tu
Zemkoho, Alain
Machine Learning
Optimization and Control
Adversarial machine learning concerns situations in which learners face attacks from active adversaries. Such scenarios arise in applications such as spam email filtering, malware detection and fake-image generation, where security methods must be actively updated to keep up with the ever improving generation of malicious data.We model these interactions between the learner and the adversary as a game and formulate the problem as a pessimistic bilevel optimisation problem with the learner taking the role of the leader. The adversary, modelled as a stochastic data generator, takes the role of the follower, generating data in response to the classifier. While existing models rely on the assumption that the adversary will choose the least costly solution leading to a convex lower-level problem with a unique solution, we present a novel model and solution method which do not make such assumptions. We compare these to the existing approach and see significant improvements in performance suggesting that relaxing these assumptions leads to a more realistic model.
title Classification under strategic adversary manipulation using pessimistic bilevel optimisation
topic Machine Learning
Optimization and Control
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.20284