The equilibrium properties of obvious strategy profiles in games with many players
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866911110616055808 |
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| author | Xu, Enxian Chen Bin Wu Hanping |
| author_facet | Xu, Enxian Chen Bin Wu Hanping |
| contents | This paper studies the equilibrium properties of the ``obvious strategy profile'' in large finite-player games. Each player in such a strategy profile simply adopts a randomized strategy as she would have used in a symmetric equilibrium of an idealized large game. We show that, under a continuity assumption, (i) obvious strategy profiles constitute a convergent sequence of approximate symmetric equilibria as the number of players tends to infinity, and (ii) realizations of such strategy profiles also form a convergent sequence of (pure strategy) approximate equilibria with probability approaching one. Our findings offer a solution that is easily implemented without coordination issues and is asymptotically optimal for players in large finite games. Additionally, we present a convergence result for approximate symmetric equilibria. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2410_22144 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The equilibrium properties of obvious strategy profiles in games with many players Xu, Enxian Chen Bin Wu Hanping Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory This paper studies the equilibrium properties of the ``obvious strategy profile'' in large finite-player games. Each player in such a strategy profile simply adopts a randomized strategy as she would have used in a symmetric equilibrium of an idealized large game. We show that, under a continuity assumption, (i) obvious strategy profiles constitute a convergent sequence of approximate symmetric equilibria as the number of players tends to infinity, and (ii) realizations of such strategy profiles also form a convergent sequence of (pure strategy) approximate equilibria with probability approaching one. Our findings offer a solution that is easily implemented without coordination issues and is asymptotically optimal for players in large finite games. Additionally, we present a convergence result for approximate symmetric equilibria. |
| title | The equilibrium properties of obvious strategy profiles in games with many players |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.22144 |