Conflux-PSRO: Effectively Leveraging Collective Advantages in Policy Space Response Oracles

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Huang, Yucong, Lian, Jiesong, Wang, Mingzhi, Ma, Chengdong, Wen, Ying
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2024
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author Huang, Yucong
Lian, Jiesong
Wang, Mingzhi
Ma, Chengdong
Wen, Ying
author_facet Huang, Yucong
Lian, Jiesong
Wang, Mingzhi
Ma, Chengdong
Wen, Ying
contents Policy Space Response Oracle (PSRO) with policy population construction has been demonstrated as an effective method for approximating Nash Equilibrium (NE) in zero-sum games. Existing studies have attempted to improve diversity in policy space, primarily by incorporating diversity regularization into the Best Response (BR). However, these methods cause the BR to deviate from maximizing rewards, easily resulting in a population that favors diversity over performance, even when diversity is not always necessary. Consequently, exploitability is difficult to reduce until policies are fully explored, especially in complex games. In this paper, we propose Conflux-PSRO, which fully exploits the diversity of the population by adaptively selecting and training policies at state-level. Specifically, Conflux-PSRO identifies useful policies from the existing population and employs a routing policy to select the most appropriate policies at each decision point, while simultaneously training them to enhance their effectiveness. Compared to the single-policy BR of traditional PSRO and its diversity-improved variants, the BR generated by Conflux-PSRO not only leverages the specialized expertise of diverse policies but also synergistically enhances overall performance. Our experiments on various environments demonstrate that Conflux-PSRO significantly improves the utility of BRs and reduces exploitability compared to existing methods.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2410_22776
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Conflux-PSRO: Effectively Leveraging Collective Advantages in Policy Space Response Oracles
Huang, Yucong
Lian, Jiesong
Wang, Mingzhi
Ma, Chengdong
Wen, Ying
Computer Science and Game Theory
Policy Space Response Oracle (PSRO) with policy population construction has been demonstrated as an effective method for approximating Nash Equilibrium (NE) in zero-sum games. Existing studies have attempted to improve diversity in policy space, primarily by incorporating diversity regularization into the Best Response (BR). However, these methods cause the BR to deviate from maximizing rewards, easily resulting in a population that favors diversity over performance, even when diversity is not always necessary. Consequently, exploitability is difficult to reduce until policies are fully explored, especially in complex games. In this paper, we propose Conflux-PSRO, which fully exploits the diversity of the population by adaptively selecting and training policies at state-level. Specifically, Conflux-PSRO identifies useful policies from the existing population and employs a routing policy to select the most appropriate policies at each decision point, while simultaneously training them to enhance their effectiveness. Compared to the single-policy BR of traditional PSRO and its diversity-improved variants, the BR generated by Conflux-PSRO not only leverages the specialized expertise of diverse policies but also synergistically enhances overall performance. Our experiments on various environments demonstrate that Conflux-PSRO significantly improves the utility of BRs and reduces exploitability compared to existing methods.
title Conflux-PSRO: Effectively Leveraging Collective Advantages in Policy Space Response Oracles
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.22776