Seasonal social dilemmas

Fuente: arXiv
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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Flores, Lucas S., de Azevedo-Lopes, Amanda, Saad-Roy, Chadi M., Traulsen, Arne
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
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_version_ 1866912095946145792
author Flores, Lucas S.
de Azevedo-Lopes, Amanda
Saad-Roy, Chadi M.
Traulsen, Arne
author_facet Flores, Lucas S.
de Azevedo-Lopes, Amanda
Saad-Roy, Chadi M.
Traulsen, Arne
contents Social dilemmas where the good of a group is at odds with individual interests are usually considered as static -- the dilemma does not change over time. In the COVID-19 pandemic, social dilemmas occurred in the mitigation of epidemic spread: Should I reduce my contacts or wear a mask to protect others? In the context of respiratory diseases, which are predominantly spreading during the winter months, some of these situations re-occur seasonally. We couple a game theoretical model, where individuals can adjust their behavior, to an epidemiological model with seasonal forcing. We find that social dilemmas can occur annually and that behavioral reactions to them can either decrease or increase the peaks of infections in a population. Our work has not only implications for seasonal infectious diseases, but also more generally for oscillatory social dilemmas: A complex interdependence between behavior and external dynamics emerges. To be effective and to exploit behavioral dynamics, intervention measures to mitigate re-occuring social dilemmas have to be timed carefully.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2410_22917
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Seasonal social dilemmas
Flores, Lucas S.
de Azevedo-Lopes, Amanda
Saad-Roy, Chadi M.
Traulsen, Arne
Physics and Society
Populations and Evolution
Social dilemmas where the good of a group is at odds with individual interests are usually considered as static -- the dilemma does not change over time. In the COVID-19 pandemic, social dilemmas occurred in the mitigation of epidemic spread: Should I reduce my contacts or wear a mask to protect others? In the context of respiratory diseases, which are predominantly spreading during the winter months, some of these situations re-occur seasonally. We couple a game theoretical model, where individuals can adjust their behavior, to an epidemiological model with seasonal forcing. We find that social dilemmas can occur annually and that behavioral reactions to them can either decrease or increase the peaks of infections in a population. Our work has not only implications for seasonal infectious diseases, but also more generally for oscillatory social dilemmas: A complex interdependence between behavior and external dynamics emerges. To be effective and to exploit behavioral dynamics, intervention measures to mitigate re-occuring social dilemmas have to be timed carefully.
title Seasonal social dilemmas
topic Physics and Society
Populations and Evolution
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.22917