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| Natura: | Preprint |
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2024
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| Accesso online: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.23243 |
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| _version_ | 1866909372699901952 |
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| author | Chen, Yiling Feng, Shi Yu, Fang-Yi |
| author_facet | Chen, Yiling Feng, Shi Yu, Fang-Yi |
| contents | Comparison data elicited from people are fundamental to many machine learning tasks, including reinforcement learning from human feedback for large language models and estimating ranking models. They are typically subjective and not directly verifiable. How to truthfully elicit such comparison data from rational individuals? We design peer prediction mechanisms for eliciting comparison data using a bonus-penalty payment. Our design leverages on the strong stochastic transitivity for comparison data to create symmetrically strongly truthful mechanisms such that truth-telling 1) forms a strict Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and 2) yields the highest payment among all symmetric equilibria. Each individual only needs to evaluate one pair of items and report her comparison in our mechanism.
We further extend the bonus-penalty payment concept to eliciting networked data, designing a symmetrically strongly truthful mechanism when agents' private signals are sampled according to the Ising models. We provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for our bonus-penalty payment to have truth-telling as a strict Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Experiments on two real-world datasets further support our theoretical discoveries. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2410_23243 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Carrot and Stick: Eliciting Comparison Data and Beyond Chen, Yiling Feng, Shi Yu, Fang-Yi Computer Science and Game Theory Comparison data elicited from people are fundamental to many machine learning tasks, including reinforcement learning from human feedback for large language models and estimating ranking models. They are typically subjective and not directly verifiable. How to truthfully elicit such comparison data from rational individuals? We design peer prediction mechanisms for eliciting comparison data using a bonus-penalty payment. Our design leverages on the strong stochastic transitivity for comparison data to create symmetrically strongly truthful mechanisms such that truth-telling 1) forms a strict Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and 2) yields the highest payment among all symmetric equilibria. Each individual only needs to evaluate one pair of items and report her comparison in our mechanism. We further extend the bonus-penalty payment concept to eliciting networked data, designing a symmetrically strongly truthful mechanism when agents' private signals are sampled according to the Ising models. We provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for our bonus-penalty payment to have truth-telling as a strict Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Experiments on two real-world datasets further support our theoretical discoveries. |
| title | Carrot and Stick: Eliciting Comparison Data and Beyond |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.23243 |