The museum pass problem with consortia
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866916463224291328 |
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| author | Gonçalves-Dosantos, Juan Carlos Martínez, Ricardo Sánchez-Soriano, Joaquín |
| author_facet | Gonçalves-Dosantos, Juan Carlos Martínez, Ricardo Sánchez-Soriano, Joaquín |
| contents | In this paper, we extend the museum pass problem to incorporate the market structure. To be more precise, we consider that museums are organized into several pass programs or consortia. Within this framework, we propose four allocation mechanisms based on the market structure and the principles of proportionality and egalitarianism. All these mechanisms satisfy different reasonable properties related to fairness and stability which serve to axiomatically characterize them. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2410_23923 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The museum pass problem with consortia Gonçalves-Dosantos, Juan Carlos Martínez, Ricardo Sánchez-Soriano, Joaquín Computer Science and Game Theory General Economics Economics In this paper, we extend the museum pass problem to incorporate the market structure. To be more precise, we consider that museums are organized into several pass programs or consortia. Within this framework, we propose four allocation mechanisms based on the market structure and the principles of proportionality and egalitarianism. All these mechanisms satisfy different reasonable properties related to fairness and stability which serve to axiomatically characterize them. |
| title | The museum pass problem with consortia |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory General Economics Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.23923 |