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Main Authors: Mu, Chunyan, Najib, Muhammad, Oren, Nir
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
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Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.00146
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author Mu, Chunyan
Najib, Muhammad
Oren, Nir
author_facet Mu, Chunyan
Najib, Muhammad
Oren, Nir
contents Responsibility plays a key role in the development and deployment of trustworthy autonomous systems. In this paper, we focus on the problem of strategic reasoning in probabilistic multi-agent systems with responsibility-aware agents. We introduce the logic PATL+R, a variant of Probabilistic Alternating-time Temporal Logic. The novelty of PATL+R lies in its incorporation of modalities for causal responsibility, providing a framework for responsibility-aware multi-agent strategic reasoning. We present an approach to synthesise joint strategies that satisfy an outcome specified in PATL+R, while optimising the share of expected causal responsibility and reward. This provides a notion of balanced distribution of responsibility and reward gain among agents. To this end, we utilise the Nash equilibrium as the solution concept for our strategic reasoning problem and demonstrate how to compute responsibility-aware Nash equilibrium strategies via a reduction to parametric model checking of concurrent stochastic multi-player games.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2411_00146
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Responsibility-aware Strategic Reasoning in Probabilistic Multi-Agent Systems
Mu, Chunyan
Najib, Muhammad
Oren, Nir
Artificial Intelligence
Responsibility plays a key role in the development and deployment of trustworthy autonomous systems. In this paper, we focus on the problem of strategic reasoning in probabilistic multi-agent systems with responsibility-aware agents. We introduce the logic PATL+R, a variant of Probabilistic Alternating-time Temporal Logic. The novelty of PATL+R lies in its incorporation of modalities for causal responsibility, providing a framework for responsibility-aware multi-agent strategic reasoning. We present an approach to synthesise joint strategies that satisfy an outcome specified in PATL+R, while optimising the share of expected causal responsibility and reward. This provides a notion of balanced distribution of responsibility and reward gain among agents. To this end, we utilise the Nash equilibrium as the solution concept for our strategic reasoning problem and demonstrate how to compute responsibility-aware Nash equilibrium strategies via a reduction to parametric model checking of concurrent stochastic multi-player games.
title Responsibility-aware Strategic Reasoning in Probabilistic Multi-Agent Systems
topic Artificial Intelligence
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.00146