Public goods games on any population structure
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2024
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| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866914319855255552 |
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| author | Wang, Chaoqian Su, Qi |
| author_facet | Wang, Chaoqian Su, Qi |
| contents | Understanding the emergence of cooperation in social networks has advanced through pairwise interactions, but the corresponding theory for group-based public goods games (PGGs) remains less explored. Here, we provide theoretical conditions under which cooperation thrives in PGGs on arbitrary population structures, which are accurate under weak selection. We find that a class of networks that would otherwise fail to produce cooperation, such as star graphs, are particularly conducive to cooperation in PGGs. More generally, PGGs can support cooperation on almost all networks, which is robust across all kinds of model details. This fundamental advantage of PGGs derives from self-reciprocity realized by group separations and from clustering through second-order interactions. We also apply PGGs to empirical networks, which shows that PGGs could be a promising interaction mode for the emergence of cooperation in real-world systems. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2411_00398 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Public goods games on any population structure Wang, Chaoqian Su, Qi Computer Science and Game Theory Cellular Automata and Lattice Gases Physics and Society Understanding the emergence of cooperation in social networks has advanced through pairwise interactions, but the corresponding theory for group-based public goods games (PGGs) remains less explored. Here, we provide theoretical conditions under which cooperation thrives in PGGs on arbitrary population structures, which are accurate under weak selection. We find that a class of networks that would otherwise fail to produce cooperation, such as star graphs, are particularly conducive to cooperation in PGGs. More generally, PGGs can support cooperation on almost all networks, which is robust across all kinds of model details. This fundamental advantage of PGGs derives from self-reciprocity realized by group separations and from clustering through second-order interactions. We also apply PGGs to empirical networks, which shows that PGGs could be a promising interaction mode for the emergence of cooperation in real-world systems. |
| title | Public goods games on any population structure |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Cellular Automata and Lattice Gases Physics and Society |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.00398 |