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A decomposition from a many-to-one matching market with path-independent choice functions to a one-to-one matching market

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Neme, Pablo, Oviedo, Jorge
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory C78, D47
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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