Pasting of Equilibria and Donsker-type Results for Mean Field Games

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Dianetti, Jodi, Nendel, Max, Tangpi, Ludovic, Wang, Shichun
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2024
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author Dianetti, Jodi
Nendel, Max
Tangpi, Ludovic
Wang, Shichun
author_facet Dianetti, Jodi
Nendel, Max
Tangpi, Ludovic
Wang, Shichun
contents This paper studies the relation between equilibria in single-period, discrete-time and continuous-time mean field game models. First, for single-period mean field games, we establish the existence of equilibria and then prove the propagation of the Lasry-Lions monotonicity to the optimal equilibrium value, as a function of the realization of the initial condition and its distribution. Secondly, we prove a pasting property for equilibria; that is, we construct equilibria to multi-period discrete-time mean field games by recursively pasting the equilibria of suitably initialized single-period games. Then, we show that any sequence of equilibria of discrete-time mean field games with discretized noise converges (up to a subsequence) to some equilibrium of the continuous-time mean field game as the mesh size of the discretization tends to zero. When the cost functions of the game satisfy the Lasry-Lions monotonicity property, we strengthen this convergence result by providing a sharp convergence rate.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2411_00633
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Pasting of Equilibria and Donsker-type Results for Mean Field Games
Dianetti, Jodi
Nendel, Max
Tangpi, Ludovic
Wang, Shichun
Optimization and Control
Probability
This paper studies the relation between equilibria in single-period, discrete-time and continuous-time mean field game models. First, for single-period mean field games, we establish the existence of equilibria and then prove the propagation of the Lasry-Lions monotonicity to the optimal equilibrium value, as a function of the realization of the initial condition and its distribution. Secondly, we prove a pasting property for equilibria; that is, we construct equilibria to multi-period discrete-time mean field games by recursively pasting the equilibria of suitably initialized single-period games. Then, we show that any sequence of equilibria of discrete-time mean field games with discretized noise converges (up to a subsequence) to some equilibrium of the continuous-time mean field game as the mesh size of the discretization tends to zero. When the cost functions of the game satisfy the Lasry-Lions monotonicity property, we strengthen this convergence result by providing a sharp convergence rate.
title Pasting of Equilibria and Donsker-type Results for Mean Field Games
topic Optimization and Control
Probability
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.00633