Sequential optimal contracting in continuous time

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: Alvarez, Guillermo Alonso, Bayraktar, Erhan, Ekren, Ibrahim, Huang, Liwei
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2024
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author Alvarez, Guillermo Alonso
Bayraktar, Erhan
Ekren, Ibrahim
Huang, Liwei
author_facet Alvarez, Guillermo Alonso
Bayraktar, Erhan
Ekren, Ibrahim
Huang, Liwei
contents In this paper we study a principal-agent problem in continuous time with multiple lump-sum payments (contracts) paid at different deterministic times. We reduce the non-zero sum Stackelberg game between the principal and agent to a standard stochastic optimal control problem. We apply our result to a benchmark model for which we investigate how different inputs (payment frequencies, payments' distribution, discounting factors, agent's reservation utility) affect the principal's value and agent's optimal compensations.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2411_04262
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Sequential optimal contracting in continuous time
Alvarez, Guillermo Alonso
Bayraktar, Erhan
Ekren, Ibrahim
Huang, Liwei
Optimization and Control
Theoretical Economics
Probability
In this paper we study a principal-agent problem in continuous time with multiple lump-sum payments (contracts) paid at different deterministic times. We reduce the non-zero sum Stackelberg game between the principal and agent to a standard stochastic optimal control problem. We apply our result to a benchmark model for which we investigate how different inputs (payment frequencies, payments' distribution, discounting factors, agent's reservation utility) affect the principal's value and agent's optimal compensations.
title Sequential optimal contracting in continuous time
topic Optimization and Control
Theoretical Economics
Probability
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.04262