Can CDT rationalise the ex ante optimal policy via modified anthropics?
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arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866910706863964160 |
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| author | Cooper, Emery Oesterheld, Caspar Conitzer, Vincent |
| author_facet | Cooper, Emery Oesterheld, Caspar Conitzer, Vincent |
| contents | In Newcomb's problem, causal decision theory (CDT) recommends two-boxing and thus comes apart from evidential decision theory (EDT) and ex ante policy optimisation (which prescribe one-boxing). However, in Newcomb's problem, you should perhaps believe that with some probability you are in a simulation run by the predictor to determine whether to put a million dollars into the opaque box. If so, then causal decision theory might recommend one-boxing in order to cause the predictor to fill the opaque box. In this paper, we study generalisations of this approach. That is, we consider general Newcomblike problems and try to form reasonable self-locating beliefs under which CDT's recommendations align with an EDT-like notion of ex ante policy optimisation. We consider approaches in which we model the world as running simulations of the agent, and an approach not based on such models (which we call 'Generalised Generalised Thirding', or GGT). For each approach, we characterise the resulting CDT policies, and prove that under certain conditions, these include the ex ante optimal policies. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2411_04462 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Can CDT rationalise the ex ante optimal policy via modified anthropics? Cooper, Emery Oesterheld, Caspar Conitzer, Vincent Artificial Intelligence Computer Science and Game Theory In Newcomb's problem, causal decision theory (CDT) recommends two-boxing and thus comes apart from evidential decision theory (EDT) and ex ante policy optimisation (which prescribe one-boxing). However, in Newcomb's problem, you should perhaps believe that with some probability you are in a simulation run by the predictor to determine whether to put a million dollars into the opaque box. If so, then causal decision theory might recommend one-boxing in order to cause the predictor to fill the opaque box. In this paper, we study generalisations of this approach. That is, we consider general Newcomblike problems and try to form reasonable self-locating beliefs under which CDT's recommendations align with an EDT-like notion of ex ante policy optimisation. We consider approaches in which we model the world as running simulations of the agent, and an approach not based on such models (which we call 'Generalised Generalised Thirding', or GGT). For each approach, we characterise the resulting CDT policies, and prove that under certain conditions, these include the ex ante optimal policies. |
| title | Can CDT rationalise the ex ante optimal policy via modified anthropics? |
| topic | Artificial Intelligence Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.04462 |