Dynkin ghost games with asymmetry and consolation
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866909379872161792 |
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| author | Ekström, Erik Wang, Yuqiong |
| author_facet | Ekström, Erik Wang, Yuqiong |
| contents | We study a stopping game of preemption type between two players who both act under uncertain competition. In this framework we introduce, and study the effect of, (i) asymmetry of payoffs, allowing e.g. for different investment costs, and (ii) consolation, i.e. partial compensation to the forestalled stopper. In general, this setting does not offer an explicit equilibrium. Instead, we provide a general verification theorem, which we then use to explore various situations in which a solution can be constructed so that an equilibrium is obtained. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2411_04802 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Dynkin ghost games with asymmetry and consolation Ekström, Erik Wang, Yuqiong Probability Optimization and Control 91A15, 60G40, 60J60 We study a stopping game of preemption type between two players who both act under uncertain competition. In this framework we introduce, and study the effect of, (i) asymmetry of payoffs, allowing e.g. for different investment costs, and (ii) consolation, i.e. partial compensation to the forestalled stopper. In general, this setting does not offer an explicit equilibrium. Instead, we provide a general verification theorem, which we then use to explore various situations in which a solution can be constructed so that an equilibrium is obtained. |
| title | Dynkin ghost games with asymmetry and consolation |
| topic | Probability Optimization and Control 91A15, 60G40, 60J60 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.04802 |