BM-PAW: A Profitable Mining Attack in the PoW-based Blockchain System
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866915278867136512 |
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| author | Hu, Junjie Ruan, Na |
| author_facet | Hu, Junjie Ruan, Na |
| contents | Mining attacks enable an adversary to procure a disproportionately large portion of mining rewards by deviating from honest mining practices within the PoW-based blockchain system. In this paper, we demonstrate that the security vulnerabilities of PoW-based blockchain extend beyond what these mining attacks initially reveal. We introduce a novel mining strategy, named BM-PAW, which yields superior rewards for both the attacker and the targeted pool compared to the state-of-the-art mining attack, PAW. BM-PAW attackers are incentivized to offer appropriate bribe money to other targets, as they comply with the attacker's directives upon receiving payment. We further find the BM-PAW attacker can circumvent the miner's dilemma through equilibrium analysis in a two-pool BM-PAW game scenario, wherein the outcome is determined by the attacker's mining power. We finally propose practical countermeasures to mitigate these novel pool attacks. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2411_06187 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | BM-PAW: A Profitable Mining Attack in the PoW-based Blockchain System Hu, Junjie Ruan, Na Cryptography and Security Mining attacks enable an adversary to procure a disproportionately large portion of mining rewards by deviating from honest mining practices within the PoW-based blockchain system. In this paper, we demonstrate that the security vulnerabilities of PoW-based blockchain extend beyond what these mining attacks initially reveal. We introduce a novel mining strategy, named BM-PAW, which yields superior rewards for both the attacker and the targeted pool compared to the state-of-the-art mining attack, PAW. BM-PAW attackers are incentivized to offer appropriate bribe money to other targets, as they comply with the attacker's directives upon receiving payment. We further find the BM-PAW attacker can circumvent the miner's dilemma through equilibrium analysis in a two-pool BM-PAW game scenario, wherein the outcome is determined by the attacker's mining power. We finally propose practical countermeasures to mitigate these novel pool attacks. |
| title | BM-PAW: A Profitable Mining Attack in the PoW-based Blockchain System |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.06187 |