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Multidimensional Screening with Precise Seller Information

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Frick, Mira, Iijima, Ryota, Ishii, Yuhta
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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