A dynamic auction for multilateral collaboration
Fuente:
arXiv
Guardado en:
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2024
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
| Etiquetas: |
Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
|
| _version_ | 1866910693009129472 |
|---|---|
| author | Huang, Chao |
| author_facet | Huang, Chao |
| contents | We study the problem of multilateral collaboration among agents with transferable utilities. Any group of agents can sign a contract consisting of a primitive contract and monetary transfers among the signatories. We propose a dynamic auction that finds a stable outcome when primitive contracts are gross complements for all participants. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2411_06545 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A dynamic auction for multilateral collaboration Huang, Chao Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory We study the problem of multilateral collaboration among agents with transferable utilities. Any group of agents can sign a contract consisting of a primitive contract and monetary transfers among the signatories. We propose a dynamic auction that finds a stable outcome when primitive contracts are gross complements for all participants. |
| title | A dynamic auction for multilateral collaboration |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.06545 |