Human game experiment to verify the equilibrium selection controlled by design
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2024
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| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866909383594606592 |
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| author | Zhijian, Wang Lixia, Shan Qinmei, Yao Yijia, Wang |
| author_facet | Zhijian, Wang Lixia, Shan Qinmei, Yao Yijia, Wang |
| contents | We conducted a laboratory experiment involving human subjects to test the theoretical hypothesis that equilibrium selection can be impacted by manipulating the games dynamics process, by using modern control theory. Our findings indicate that human behavior consists with the predictions derived from evolutionary game theory paradigm. The consistency is supported by three key observations: (1) the long-term distribution of strategies in the strategy space, (2) the cyclic patterns observed within this space, and (3) the speed of convergence to the selected equilibrium. These findings suggest that the design of controllers aimed at equilibrium selection can indeed achieve their theoretical intended purpose. The location of this study in the knowledge tree of evolutionary game science is presented. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2411_06847 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Human game experiment to verify the equilibrium selection controlled by design Zhijian, Wang Lixia, Shan Qinmei, Yao Yijia, Wang General Economics Economics Chaotic Dynamics We conducted a laboratory experiment involving human subjects to test the theoretical hypothesis that equilibrium selection can be impacted by manipulating the games dynamics process, by using modern control theory. Our findings indicate that human behavior consists with the predictions derived from evolutionary game theory paradigm. The consistency is supported by three key observations: (1) the long-term distribution of strategies in the strategy space, (2) the cyclic patterns observed within this space, and (3) the speed of convergence to the selected equilibrium. These findings suggest that the design of controllers aimed at equilibrium selection can indeed achieve their theoretical intended purpose. The location of this study in the knowledge tree of evolutionary game science is presented. |
| title | Human game experiment to verify the equilibrium selection controlled by design |
| topic | General Economics Economics Chaotic Dynamics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.06847 |